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  Do foreign-owned firms provide better working conditions  
than their domestic counterparts?  A comparative analysis
 
by 
Alexander Hijzen, Pedro S. Martins, Thorsten Schank and Richard Upward 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses to what extent working conditions in foreign-owned firms differ from those in 
their domestic counterparts. It makes three main contributions. First, we replicate the consensus in the 
empirical literature by applying a standardised methodology to firm-level data for three developed 
(Germany, Portugal, UK) and two emerging economies (Brazil, Indonesia). We show that, consistent 
with previous evidence, foreign-owned firms offer substantially higher average wages than domestic 
firms and that this difference is particularly important in emerging economies. Second, we show that 
these positive wage effects of foreign takeovers reduce in size when controlling for changes in the 
composition of the workforce, although they tend to remain positive and statistically significant. 
However, the wage effects associated with worker movements from domestic to foreign firms are 
potentially important, particularly in emerging economies.  Third, we look not only at wage outcomes 
but also consider other working conditions such as working hours, job stability and union coverage.  
We find that foreign takeovers of domestic firms tend to have a small positive effect on wages, but 
little effect on other aspects of working conditions. 
JEL classification: F14, F16, F23 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, foreign wage premia 
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Is it better to work for a foreign-owned firm?  Although foreign-owned firms are sometimes presented as 
a malign influence on workers, many studies have found that, in fact, these firms pay significantly 
higher wages than domestic firms.  However, three key questions remain unresolved. 
 
First, is the difference in wages between foreign and domestic firms genuinely the result of the firms’ 
ownership structure?  Perhaps foreign-owned firms are located in high-paying industries, or perhaps 
they employ more productive workers.  We would really like to know whether equivalent jobs in foreign 
firms pay higher wages.   
 
Second, are other aspects of jobs in foreign-firms also better?  Perhaps the higher wage is 
compensation for longer hours, less job security and lower union protection.   
 
Third, different studies have come to different conclusions about the size of the wage gap.  Is this 
because foreign-owned firms behave differently in different countries, or is it that different studies use 
different data sources and different methods? 
 
In this paper we look at jobs in the UK, Germany, Portugal, Brazil and Indonesia to see if we can 
answer these three questions.  By using comparable data and comparable methods in each country, 
we can see if the foreign wage gap is genuinely bigger in some countries than others.  By using data on 
wages, hours of work, union status and job security we can see whether foreign firms offer better jobs 
over all, rather than just in terms of the wage.  Finally, by using data on individual workers in firms, we 
can compare equivalent jobs in foreign and domestic firms.  We also compare jobs before and after 
firms change their ownership from domestic to foreign. 
 
We find that foreign firms pay higher wages in all five countries, and the difference in wages between 
foreign and domestic firms is largest in the least developed countries.  But we also find that the real gap 
in wages may be smaller than previously thought.  Once we compare equivalent jobs in equivalent 
firms, the wage gap is less than 4%.  We also find that other aspects of jobs, like job security, hours or 
work and union status do not seem to vary systematically with ownership status.  This implies that 
foreign-owned firms do not export their own working practices abroad.  For example, US multinationals 
do not impose US-style working practices in their affiliates.  This is presumably because foreign firms 
must adopt working practices in the host country.    1
                                                     
1 Introduction 
Is it better to work for a multinational or a national firm?  Until recently, a large empirical literature had 
reached a consensus that foreign firms pay higher wages than their domestic counterparts.
1  However, with 
the increasing availability of linked employer-employer data (LEED) this consensus has been challenged.  
For example, Martins (2004) for Portugal and Heyman et al. (2007) for Sweden show that, after controlling 
for both worker and firm characteristics, the effects of foreign ownership may disappear or even become 
negative.  This seems to be because, essentially, foreign-owned firms select on worker quality: workers in 
foreign-owned firms would have earned more even had they worked for domestically-owned firms.   
However, other studies, including Andrews et al. (2009) for Germany, Malchow-Moller et al. (2007) for 
Denmark and Balsvik (2007) for Finland, point at positive, albeit small, wage effects.  
It is not clear what drives the differences in estimated wage premia across studies.  They may reflect 
differences in country characteristics or the nature of FDI.  However, it is also possible that they reflect 
differences in the econometric methodology.  Moreover, the use of linked employer-employee data has 
been limited to developed countries, and it is an open question what the effect of controlling for firm and 
worker selection would be for the estimation of foreign wage premia in developing countries, where such 
premia are believed to be much larger (Moran, 2006).  
Less attention has been directed towards the effects of foreign ownership on other aspects of workers’ 
employment conditions, and the extent to which multinational enterprises (MNEs) export working 
conditions abroad.  An important exception is a recent study by Bloom et al. (2009) who use survey data 
on management and work-life balance practices to analyze to what extent US multinationals export such 
practices to their affiliates in Europe.  There is also far less evidence on the impact of foreign ownership on 
different groups of workers.  While a number of studies have analysed how foreign ownership affects the 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers, very few studies attempt to go beyond this. Heyman et al. (2006) 
provide a notable exception in their study of the effects of cross-border takeovers on wage dispersion.  
The contribution of the present paper is threefold.  First, we replicate the consensus in the empirical 
literature by applying a standardised methodology to firm-level data for three developed and two emerging 
 
1 Note that most researchers have focused on pay differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms because the 
available data often  do not identify multinational firms, and this is also the approach we take here.   2
                                                     
economies. Second, we provide internationally comparable evidence on the role of foreign ownership for 
average wages that controls for worker selection using worker-level data for four countries.
  2  Third, in 
contrast to much of the empirical literature, the present paper is not limited to analysing the average effects 
of foreign ownership on wages, but expands the focus to a wider set of wage and non-wage working 
conditions.  It analyses the wage effects of foreign ownership across three different skill groups and low-
paid workers.  It also considers how foreign ownership affects hours of work, job stability and union 
coverage. 
The role of foreign ownership for wages and working conditions is identified by focusing on changes in 
ownership status as a result of cross-border acquisitions or worker movements.  In order to overcome the 
problem of selection bias that is associated with the non-random nature of firm acquisitions and worker 
movements the study makes use of propensity score matching in combination with difference-in-
differences methods.
3 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we replicate the consensus in the empirical literature that was 
based on firm-level studies of cross-border takeovers, by showing that foreign-owned firms offer 
substantially higher average wages than domestic firms and that this difference is particularly important in 
emerging economies. Second, we show, using linked employer-employee data for four countries, that these 
positive wage effects of foreign takeovers reduce substantially when controlling for changes in the 
composition of the workforce, although they tend to remain positive and statistically significant. However, 
the wage effects associated with worker movements from domestic to foreign firms are potentially 
important, particularly in emerging economies.  Third, going beyond average wages, we find little 
systematic evidence for the role of foreign ownership for other aspects of working conditions.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses under what circumstances foreign-
owned firms may have incentives to offer different wages and better working conditions to similar workers 
doing similar jobs to their local counterparts.  Section 3 discusses the empirical literature on the effects of 
foreign ownership on wages and working conditions.  Section 4 discusses the various data sources used 
and their comparability across countries.  Section 5 presents the econometric methodology and Section 6 
presents the results. The final section presents some concluding remarks.  
 
2 Indonesia is excluded from this part of the analysis for reasons of data availability. 
3 This method will yield estimates of causal effects if the unobservable determinants of firm acquisitions or worker 
mobility are fixed over time.   3
                                                     
2 Theory 
In a perfectly competitive setting, firms are price-takers in output and input markets and all workers are 
paid their marginal product.  Consequently, one would expect foreign-owned firms to offer similar pay and 
working conditions to individuals with similar characteristics doing similar jobs.  However, one might still 
find differences in wages between domestic and foreign-owned firms, for two reasons.  
First, in competitive labour markets, wages and working conditions are substitutes: pay differences are 
used to compensate for differences in working conditions that are valued by workers.  For example, it is 
sometimes suggested that jobs are less secure in foreign-owned firms because they are “footloose” or have 
more elastic labour demand.  This could provide a rationale for foreign-owned firms to offer higher wages 
than their local competitors to compensate for lower job security.  Conversely, workers may be willing to 
accept working for lower pay in foreign-owned firms initially if there is the possibility of subsequent 
training and career development.  In short, wages might differ between foreign-owned and domestic firms 
because the quality of jobs differs. 
Second, there may be average pay differentials at the firm-level due to differences in workforce 
composition and human-resource practices between multinational and domestic firms.  For example, 
foreign-owned and domestic firms may hire different types of workers.  Alternatively, it may be that 
foreign-owned and domestic firms have different human-resource practices related to, for example, the 
importance of training, on-the-job learning and career development.  As a result, workers with similar 
characteristics at the start of a job develop differently, thereby giving rise to pay differentials. 
In non-competitive labour markets, differences in pay and working conditions between foreign-owned and 
domestic firms may occur even for individuals with similar characteristics doing a similar job, for several 
reasons.  First, search frictions reduce the degree to which arbitrage takes place across firms due to 
differences in labour productivity for identical workers.  As a result, high-performance firms may derive 
monopsony power from their ownership advantage, allowing them to pay their workers less than their 
marginal value product, but more than their local competitors.  In most search models it is assumed that 
wages are determined through Nash bargaining.  This implies that high-performance firms are likely to pay 
higher wages and provide better working conditions.
4  If foreign firms tend to be high-performance firms, 
 
4 The cost-saving that can be achieved by a MNE thanks to its monopsony power is likely to fall with the availability 
of comparable jobs outside the MNE which may be closely related to the level of economic development. Decreuse 
and Maarek (2007) refer in this context to a technology-rent effect, which allows MNEs to derive monopsony power 
from their technological advance, and a competition-wage effect, that follows from the competition between firms for   4
                                                                                                                                                                            
as is typically assumed (Helpman et al., 2004), workers in such firms may be expected to receive better 
working conditions than their counterparts in less productive domestic firms. 
Second, rather than having an ad hoc rule to distribute rents between firms and workers, market failures 
may interact with firm characteristics to give rise to differences in the way rents are distributed across 
firms, even after controlling for differences in productivity.
5  Firms that derive their productivity advantage 
from firm-specific knowledge may wish to provide better working conditions in the hope that this would 
reduce worker turnover and minimize the risk of their productivity advantage spilling over to competing 
firms (Fosfuri et al., 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002).  Foreign-owned firms may also differ in terms of 
monitoring costs, managerial responsiveness to industrial-relations demands and in their preferences over 
the use of pay incentives to motivate the workforce.  Finally, firms may differ in terms of their bargaining 
power relative to trade unions, because they differ in terms of their outside options.  In sum, efficiency-
wage arguments based on the role of firm-specific assets and pay incentives may explain why foreign-
owned firms provide better working conditions to individual workers than their local counterparts, while 
foreign-owned firms may be less inclined to give in to trade union demands as they may be able to relocate 
production activities to another country. 
The extent to which foreign-owned firms offer better pay and working conditions than their local 
counterparts for similar workers doing a similar job may vary across the country of ownership  and the 
countries in which they operate, as well as between different groups of the workforce.  We hypothesise that 
the gap in working conditions between foreign-owned and domestic firms will be greater in developing 
countries because the technological difference is likely to be greatest, and the availability of comparable 
alternative job opportunities lowest.
6  We also hypothesise that foreign-owned firms will offer relatively 
better working conditions for skilled workers.  Worker turnover of skilled workers is more likely to lead to 
the dispersion of firm-specific knowledge, thereby undermining the productivity advantage of foreign-
 
labour services. See also Martins and Yong (2010), who study rent sharing between multinational parents and their 
affiliates and find stronger links when affiliates are more distant from their parents.  
5 In fact, the arguments discussed here provide a rationale for assuming Nash-bargaining in search models of the 
labour market. 
6 Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) develop a model which shows that this does not necessarily have to be the case as 
this depends on the relative average productivities of multinational and national firms in developed and developing 
countries. However, given the large average differences in productivity between national firms in developed and 
developing countries this seems a reasonable conjecture.    5
                                                     
owned firms.
7  To the extent that it takes time to acquire firm-specific knowledge, the incentive to offer 
better working conditions should also increase with job tenure, particularly among skilled workers.  
3  Empirical literature  
3.1 Firm-level  evidence 
There is a large empirical literature on foreign wage premia.  Because data limitations generally do not 
allow distinguishing between multinational and national firms, most studies have focused on pay 
differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms instead.  Until recently, there was a consensus that 
foreign firms tend to pay higher wages than their domestic counterparts, particularly in developing 
countries.  In an early study for Mexico, the US and Venezuela, Aitken et al. (1996) show that average 
wages in foreign-owned plants are about 30% higher than in domestic plants. These wage differences 
persist after controlling for size, geographic location, skill mix and capital intensity in Mexico and 
Venezuela, but not in the United States.  This suggests that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than 
their local competitors in developing countries. However, this does not necessarily mean that foreign 
ownership improves employment conditions when a domestic firm is being taken over by a foreign firm.  
Foreign firms may cherry-pick the best domestic firms on the basis of characteristics that are not controlled 
for in the regression analysis, but are associated with higher average wages.  One such variable is the 
quality of the labour force.  In order to address this possibility, subsequent studies have analyzed the extent 
to which foreign wage premia persist after controlling for observable measures of worker quality as well as 
unobservable time-invariant firm fixed effects.
8 
Most recent studies focus on cross-border takeovers to analyze the causal effect of a change in ownership 
status on worker outcomes by making use of firm-level panel data.  The main advantage of panel data is 
that it allows one to control for firm-selection, i.e. the possibility that foreign-owned plants differ from 
 
7 However, in developing countries where the respect for basic labour and human rights may present real problems, 
reputation-sensitive foreign firms may also have strong incentives to offer better conditions to low-skilled workers. 
See Harrison and Scorse (2010) for an analysis of the impact of anti-sweatshop activism in the US on wages and 
employment in the foreign suppliers of US multinationals in Indonesia.  
8 For example, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) ask whether foreign wage premia may simply reflect differences in worker 
composition between foreign and domestic firms.  In order to address this possibility, they use a plant-level dataset 
for Indonesia with detailed information on the composition of workers across educational categories.  They find that, 
while differences in average labour quality account for a significant part of the raw foreign wage premium, foreign 
wage premia remain large, i.e. wages in foreign-owned plants are 12% higher for production workers and 20% for 
non-production workers.  Te Velde and Morrissey (2003) present similar findings for five Sub-Saharan African 
countries.   6
                                                     
domestic plants because foreign investors select their targets on the basis of unobservable time-invariant 
characteristics rather than ownership status per se.  Girma and Görg (2007) find, for the UK, that foreign 
takeovers of domestic firms tend to increase wages, but also that their effect depends on the industry of 
target firms and the nationality of acquirers.  For Indonesia, Lipsey and Sjöholm (2006) find that even after 
controlling for firm-fixed effects, foreign takeovers raise production workers’ wages by 17% and non-
production workers’ wages by 33%.  More generally, these studies show that controlling for fixed effects 
reduces the estimated foreign wage premium without, however, challenging the basic finding that foreign-
owned firms pay higher wages than domestic firms. 
3.2  Evidence from linked employer-employee data  
The results from firm-level studies may be somewhat misleading because they do not control for worker 
selection, i.e. the possibility that ownership changes are associated with changes in the composition of the 
workforce.  To the extent that unskilled workers tend to leave after takeovers and skilled workers join, this 
would bias the estimated foreign wage premium upwards.  Using linked employer-employee data, it is 
possible to control for changes in the composition of the workforce by focusing on the wage effects for 
individual workers who stay in the same firm.  Those data also allow one to look at the role of ownership 
for workers who change jobs between domestic and foreign firms.  This is interesting because it allows an 
analysis of differences in pay conditions between foreign and domestic firms for new workers.  As 
productivity differences may have more important implications for workers at the moment of hiring than 
for stayers (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991; Pissarides, 2009), one may expect the role of ownership to be 
more important for this category of workers.
9 
An increasing number of studies have made use of linked employer-employee data to analyse the role of 
foreign ownership for individual wages.  The results challenge the conventional wisdom by suggesting that 
foreign takeovers in developed countries have, at best, a small positive effect on individual wages and that 
this effect could even be negative.  For example, Martins (2004) shows for Portugal that the foreign wage 
premium disappears after controlling for worker selection and may even reduce individual wages by 3% 
for workers in foreign firms relative to their counterparts in domestic firms.  Heyman et al. (2007a) present 
similar findings for Sweden which also indicate that foreign takeovers may reduce individual wages 
relative to their counterparts in domestic firms, while Andrews et al. (2009) for Germany, Malchow-Moller 
et al. (2007) for Denmark and Balsvik (2007) for Finland find small positive effects (1%–3%).   Relatively 
 
9 In addition, the analysis of worker movements takes account of both foreign-owned firms that were previously 
domestic, but have been acquired by a foreign owner, and those that are established through “Greenfield” investment.   7
                                                     
few studies exploit worker mobility to analyse the role of foreign ownership.  Two exceptions are Andrews 
et al. (2009) and Balsvik (2006), who show that workers moving from a domestic to a foreign firm 
experience a 6% increase in wages in Germany and 8% in Norway.
10  These findings may indicate that the 
short-term effects of foreign ownership may be more important for new hires in foreign firms than workers 
who stay in firms that change ownership.  Table 1 summarises the previous empirical literature on foreign 
wage premia. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Overall, the recent evidence based on worker-level data provides a somewhat mixed message with respect 
to the impact of foreign ownership on wages.  While most studies indicate that foreign ownership has a 
positive impact on wages, a number of studies indicate small negative effects.  It is not clear what drives 
these differences in estimated wage premia across studies.  They may reflect differences in country 
characteristics or the nature of FDI, as well as differences in methodology.  Moreover, the effect of 
controlling for changes in the composition of the workforce on the estimation of foreign wage premia in 
developing countries (where such premia are believed to be much larger) remains an open question.  In 
order to better understand the implications of these new findings, we provide the first comparable cross-
country evidence for a number of developing and developed countries. 
3.3  The impact of foreign ownership on non-wage working conditions 
Very little is known about the impact of foreign ownership on non-wage working conditions.  While the 
definition of employment conditions differs across studies, the literature appears to suggest that MNEs 
have a relatively low tendency to export labour practices to their foreign affiliates, tending instead to adapt 
to local practices (e.g. Almond and Ferner, 2006).  Bloom et al. (2009) use survey data on management 
and work-life balance practices for over 700 medium-sized firms in the US, UK, Germany and France to 
analyze to what extent US multinationals export certain practices to their affiliates in Europe.  The 
evidence indicates that US MNEs export management practices but not “work-life” balance practices.  
Freeman et al. (2007) compare labour practices in domestic and foreign affiliates of a single US firm in 
different countries and also find that US firms adapt their labour practices to host-country conditions to an 
important extent. 
 
10 Martins (2010) finds similar results for Portugal.   8
                                                     
The literature suggests a number of reasons why US MNEs might have a low propensity to export labour 
practices.  First, labour practices tend to be embedded in national rules and social norms.  For example, the 
extensive regulation of the labour market in many European countries and the strong role of trade unions 
may make it difficult or unattractive for US MNEs to export labour practices to Europe (Bloom et al., 
2009; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).  Second, the low propensity of US MNEs to export working 
practices may also reflect strategic considerations.  For example, local affiliates with a domestic market 
orientation may enjoy a significantly greater degree of discretion about the way human resources are 
managed than local affiliates that are more export-oriented (Harzing, 2000; Fento-O’Creevy et al., 2008).
11  
Finally, the low propensity of US MNEs to export labour practices may reflect the specific management 
style of US MNEs and not be representative for MNEs originating from other countries. 
There appears to be no systematic evidence on the propensity of MNEs to export labour practices to 
developing countries.  It is therefore not obvious to what extent the results for developed countries carry 
over to developing countries.  On the one hand, enforcement of labour provisions and trade unions tend to 
be weaker in developing countries, thereby reducing the role of institutional constraints for the foreign 
affiliates of MNEs to implement the same labour practices they use in OECD countries.  On the other 
hand, labour practices that are socially acceptable in developing countries may not be acceptable to the 
consumers and investors in developed countries, creating incentives for MNEs from developed countries to 
export their human-resource practices abroad. 
4  Data sources and cross-country comparability 
4.1 Data  sources 
The data used for this paper are drawn from the national administrative systems of five countries.  
Brazil 
The main data source is RAIS (Annual Social Information Report), an annual census of all firms and their 
employees. It contains detailed information for each employee (wages, hours worked, education, age, 
 
11 This may reflect a greater need for coordination in the context of vertical FDI than for horizontal FDI.   9
                                                     
tenure, gender, etc) and each firm (industry, region, size, establishment type, etc).
12  With the 
establishment identification number it is possible to follow all establishments that file the RAIS survey.  
Moreover, with the worker’s national insurance number, it is possible to follow all workers that remain in 
the formal sector and to match the workers’ characteristics with those of the establishment.  Therefore, we 
can create a panel that matches workers to their establishments and follow each of them over time.  The 
establishment identifier is used to link RAIS with external sources with information on cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions and foreign ownership (Thomson Financial and ORBIS).  
Germany 
Two data sources are used.  First, the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) Establishment 
Panel.  The IAB panel is an annual survey of approximately 16,000 plants located in both West and East 
Germany.  It covers 1% of all plants and 7% of all employment in Germany, and is therefore a sample 
weighted towards larger plants.  The IAB Panel includes information on employment, bargaining 
arrangements, total sales, exports, investment, wage bill, location, industry, profit level and nationality of 
ownership.  Ownership is defined as either West German, East German, foreign, or public.  Complete 
information on plant ownership is available for all plants only in 2000 and 2004.  The analysis is therefore 
restricted to those two years only.  Second, we use the employment statistics register of the German 
Federal Office of Labour (Beschäftigtenstatistik).  The Beschäftigtenstatistik covers all employees or 
trainees registered by the social insurance system.  Reported daily gross wages are censored at the social 
security contribution ceiling.  The register covers about 80% of employees in West Germany and about 
85% in East Germany.  Information on employees includes basic demographics, start and end dates of 
employment spells, occupation and industry, earnings, qualifications (school and post-school), and a plant 
identification number.  By using the plant identification number, we can associate each worker with a plant 
in the panel. Our analysis is based on western Germany (since the eastern German labor market is still in a 
special transformation process) 
 
12 RAIS is an administrative report filed by all tax registered Brazilian establishments. Since the information may be 
used for investigation about labour legislation compliance, firms that do not comply with it do not file in RAIS. Thus, 
this data set can be considered a census of the formal  Brazilian labour market (State-owned enterprises, public 
administration and non-profit organizations are also required to file the report). Firms that do not provide accurate 
information will be committing an offense sanctioned by law, a threat that is likely to lead to very high standards of 
data quality.   10
                                                     
Portugal  
The analysis draws on a large matched employer-employee data set, Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel 
Records), a compulsory survey conducted annually by the Ministry of Employment of all firms located in 
Portugal with at least one employee.  Quadros de Pessoal provides detailed information on all workers in 
each firm including gender, education, tenure, wages and hours worked, and their firms including foreign 
ownership, sales, industry and region.
13  There is also a unique identifier for each firm and individual that 
allows one to follow firms and individuals through time.  
United Kingdom 
The analysis makes use of the Business Structure Database (BSD) and Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE).  The BSD is a series of annual snapshots from the Inter-Departmental Business Register 
(IDBR), a live register of UK businesses maintained by the ONS, containing information on employment, 
sales, foreign ownership, industry and regions as well as a unique enterprise reference number.  The ASHE 
is a 1% random sample of employees with detailed information on pay and hours of work and can be 
linked to the BSD using the enterprise reference number. 
Indonesia 
The analysis makes use of the Indonesian Census of Manufacturing (Survei Manufaktur), which is 
conducted annually by the National Statistical Office (BPS).  The data include all manufacturing plants 
with more than 20 employees.  Linked worker-firm data are not available, and therefore Indonesia can only 
be included in the firm-level analysis.  
4.2 Cross-country  comparability 
Table 2 summarises information on the various data sources in order to get a sense of their comparability 
across countries.  The main focus is on the four countries for which linked employer-employee data are 
available. The datasets differ along three key dimensions: the sampling methodology, the unit of 
observation and coverage.  The sampling methodology may in turn differ in terms of the sampling frame 
and the sampling method.  One can distinguish two types of sampling frames (Vilhuber 2007): worker-
based sample frames and firm-based sample frames.  The German data present an example of a firm-based 
 
13 Particular care is placed on the reliability of the information, as that is used by the Ministry of Employment for the 
purpose of checking the employer’s compliance with labour law.   11
sample, where we have a sample of firms for which all (or most) workers can be identified.  The UK data 
is a worker-based sample in the sense that for a fraction of the workforce all employers can be identified.  
In addition to the sampling frame, the data sources may also differ in terms of the sampling method that is 
used to sample individual units from the sampling frame.  The German data are an example of a non-
random size-weighted sample.  The UK data, by contrast, include a 1% random sample of all employees. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Differences in the sampling frame affect the extent to which specific issues can be appropriately analysed 
in different countries, and as a result, affect the scope for cross-country analysis.  Worker-based samples 
are appropriate for the analysis of worker outcomes, but may be ill-suited for the analysis of firm 
outcomes. For example, worker-based samples can be usefully employed to analyse the effects of 
globalisation (including foreign ownership) for individual workers, but are less adequate for the analysis of 
worker composition for firm outcomes (worker turnover or skill composition).  The main drawback of 
firm-based samples is that it reduces the ability to analyse worker movements across establishments.  This 
is due to the fact that in firm-based samples the probability that a worker switches from a firm in the 
sample to another firm in the sample depends on the sample size of firms.  It is possible therefore that the 
German sample is not appropriate for the analysis of foreign ownership based on worker movements due to 
the relatively small number of worker movements between establishments in the sample.  
In addition to sample-based data, some data sources include the entire universe of (formal sector) firms and 
workers.  The data for Brazil and Portugal are examples of this.  Such data are ideal in the sense that they 
are not subject to any a priori limitations due to the characteristics of the sampling methodology.   
Unfortunately, data such as these are only available for a very limited number of countries. 
The cross-country comparability of the analysis may further be impaired due to differences in the unit of 
observation.  The analysis for the UK is conducted at the level of the firm (or “enterprise”), whereas the 
analysis for Germany is necessarily conducted at the level of the plant (or “establishment”).  The analysis 
for Brazil and Portugal can, in principle, be conducted at either level.  These differences create differences 
in firm-size statistics and may also have implications for the definition of foreign ownership. 
Finally, the various samples may differ in terms of their coverage across sectors and over time.  The data 
for Brazil, Portugal, Germany and the UK include all market sectors.  The data for Indonesia only span the 
manufacturing sector.  The data for Portugal and the United Kingdom broadly span the same time period, 
whereas the years covered in the German data is more limited.    12
                                                     
4.3 Descriptive  statistics 
In this sub-section, we briefly discuss a number of descriptive statistics with the aim of both illustrating 
potential problems related to the cross-country comparability of the results, and to preview the econometric 
analysis in the next section. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics on log wages at the individual and plant-level by ownership status and 
country.
14  The table shows that, as one would expect, wages in foreign-owned firms are higher, on 
average, than those in domestic firms.  However, these comparisons do not reveal whether these wage 
differences are due to differences in the composition of the workforce, the characteristics of foreign and 
domestic firms or ownership status per se.  Moreover, average differences might hide differences in the 
distribution of wages across foreign and domestic firms.  For example, foreign-owned firms may provide 
larger wage differentials for skilled than unskilled workers. 
The econometric analysis will focus on the wages of individuals whose employer changes ownership 
status, or who move between employers of different ownership status, relative to a control group.  Table 4 
reports the number of ownership changes in the sample for each treatment and country.  
The number of firms that change ownership status as a result of cross-border takeovers tends to be 
substantial except in Germany (due to the use of just two years and the nature of the sample) and Brazil in 
the case of domestic takeovers of foreign firms. As the number of domestic takeovers of foreign firms was 
less than 10 in Brazil, this case was dropped from the analysis for this country. At the worker level, 
changes in ownership as a result of cross-border takeover are much larger as each takeover affects the 
entire workforce in the target firm. The proportion of workers who work in a domestic firm which is 
acquired by a foreign firm (1%-6%) is higher than the proportion who work for a foreign firm that is 
acquired by a domestic firm (0.6%-1.9%). 
15  
The number of individuals who move between domestic and foreign-owned firms is generally smaller than 
that of individuals who change ownership status as a result of takeovers, but relatively large compared to 
the actual number of cross-border takeovers.  In the UK, about 1% of all employees in the sample switches 
from a domestic to foreign firm and 0.7% change from a foreign to a domestic firm.  In Portugal, 0.7% of 
 
14 Worker-level information is not available for Indonesia. 
15 The shares are largest for Germany in both cases. This is likely to reflect in part the size-weighted sample of the 
German data.  all employees move from a domestic to foreign-owned firm and 0.5% from foreign-owned to domestic. In 
the samples for Brazil and Germany, worker movements between foreign-owned and domestic firms tend 
to be less common. The relatively small number of job movers in the Brazilian reflects the relatively small 
size of the “foreign sector” in our data, while for Germany this reflects the firm-based nature of the sample.   
[Insert Table 4] 
 
5 Methodology 
Four different changes in ownership status (“treatments”) will be considered: foreign takeovers of domestic 
firms; domestic takeovers of foreign firms; workers who change jobs from domestic to foreign employers; 
and finally, workers who change jobs from foreign to domestic employers.  Each treatment will be 
evaluated at a point in time less than 12 months after the change in ownership status occurs (t=0), one to 
two years after the change in ownership status (t=1), and two to three years after the change in ownership 
status at (t=2).
16 
The analysis of cross-border takeovers (T) involves comparing workers who stay in a firm that does not 
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where T refers to treatment status of worker i, F to ownership status of firm j, and t to time relative to the 
year in which the change in F occurs.  The analysis of worker movements (M) involves comparing workers 
who stay in a firm that does not change ownership status with workers who switch to another firm with 
different ownership status. 
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16 Note that because we have annual panel data, the precise date of change of ownership is not known.  We use the method of propensity-score matching (PSM) in combination with difference-in-differences.  
PSM involves constructing treated and control groups ex post using the observable characteristics of firms 
and workers before the change in F occurs.  Like OLS, PSM provides estimates of the causal impact if 
selection into the treatment is on the basis of the observed covariates used in the propensity model.  The 
mean difference in outcomes between the treated and untreated gives the average treatment effect on the 
treated.  Formally, this can be written as follows:  
 
10 ˆ (1 ) ( ATT EyT EyT α == −= 0 )  (2) 
where the superscripts 0 and 1 refer to untreated and treated firms, respectively, T is the dummy for 
treatment status and y is the outcome of interest. 
The propensity score is estimated with a Probit model which specifies the probability of changing 
ownership status as a function of industry, region and skill dummies, log employment, log average wage, 
log individual wage, a gender dummy, age, age squared and tenure.  All these variables are measured at 
t=−1, the year before F changes.  For case 1B, we also include firm characteristics at t=0 to control for the 
characteristics of the new employer in addition to the old employer.  Treated individuals are matched to 
their untreated counterparts using one-to-one nearest-neighbour matching which attributes a weight of one 
to the nearest untreated neighbour of each treated observation and zero to others.  The estimation of the 
propensity score and the matching procedure are conducted separately for each year, broad industry 
(manufacturing or services) and skill group (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled). 
Propensity-score matching is complemented with the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator, following 
Heckman  et al. (1997).  The DiD-estimator controls for any pre-existing constant differences in the 
outcome variable before the change in ownership, even if those differences are caused by unobservable 
attributes.  The actual regressions are estimated with (firm or worker) fixed effects, which represent a 
generalisation of DiD.  The sample is restricted to individuals that are present each year of relative time 
period t=−1 to t=2. In order to avoid conflating treatment and composition effects related to the appearance 
pattern of individuals, each cohort is balanced. 
Using the matched sample of treated and controls the following model is estimated: 










  14  15
where ai is a fixed effect for individual i, γt refers to the treatment effect at relative time t, Ti is a treatment 
dummy, δt refers to the effect of relative time, Dt is a relative time dummy and εit represents a white noise 
term. 
One drawback of Equation (3) is that it takes only account of the effects of ownership changes up to three 
years after the event. To the extent that the positive effects of ownership changes take time to materialize, 
the DiD results may not capture the full effect of foreign ownership.  For this reason, it is worth 
complementing the DiD results with simple level comparisons between foreign and domestic firms that 
control for observable characteristics.  While these comparisons may provide upward biased estimates of 
foreign-domestic differences in employment conditions, they are also more likely to capture the long-term 
effects of foreign-owned firms on domestic labour markets.  These results may thus be interpreted as 
giving an upper bound on the long-term effects of foreign ownership on employment conditions. 
6 Results 
In this section the empirical evidence on the effects of foreign ownership will be presented.  Section 6.1 
focuses on the effects of cross-border takeovers on average wages using firm-level data, while Section 6.2 
reports the estimated effects of cross-border takeovers and worker movements between domestic and 
foreign firms for individual wages using linked worker-firm data.  Section 6.3 considers the effects of 
foreign takeovers on a range of alternative outcome variables. 
6.1  The average effect of foreign ownership on firm-level wages and employment 
Table 5 presents firm-level evidence using recent data for Germany, Portugal, the UK, Brazil, and 
Indonesia. The analysis focuses on both the wage and the employment effects of cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions.  The raw differences in average wages and employment between foreign-owned and local 
firms are large in all of the five countries.  Foreign-owned firms pay considerably more on average than 
local firms, with pay differences varying from 26% in Germany to 37% in the UK, 59% in Portugal, 77% 
in Indonesia, and 133% in Brazil.  Foreign-owned firms also employ many more workers than domestic 
firms, on average, with employment differences ranging from 83% in Portugal to 200% in Brazil.  This 
does not necessarily mean that foreign-owned firms provide more and better jobs than comparable 
domestic firms, but these raw differences are still a potentially important policy consideration.  If foreign-
owned firms are the result of setting up new businesses (“greenfield investment”), then the fact that they 
are larger and pay higher wages than the average domestic firm is probably relevant to policy-makers and   16
workers.  On the other hand, if foreign firms are acquiring domestic firms then these raw differences are of 
less interest. 
Controlling for observable firm characteristics considerably reduces the average wage and employment 
differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms, but they still remain sizable.  The wage gap ranges 
from 11% in Germany to 30% in the UK, 32% in Indonesia, 36% in Portugal and 105% in Brazil.  The 
employment gap varies from 78% in Portugal to 87% in the UK, 107% in Indonesia, 116% in Germany 
and 188% in Brazil. Of course, these numbers may still be biased upwards because foreign-owned and 
domestically-owned firms may be different due to the remaining unobserved heterogeneity. 
In the two bottom panels of Table 5 we therefore report estimates based on the change in wages and 
employment following changes in foreign ownership status.  This additionally controls for pre-existing 
fixed differences between different types of firm.  Foreign takeovers of domestic firms do increase average 
wages, although the size of the effect varies considerably across countries.  The effects range from 3% in 
Germany to 5% in the UK, 8% in Portugal, 11% in Brazil, and 19% in Indonesia, while the effect is 
positive but only statistically significant at the 10% level in Germany.  These results, the first to use a 
consistent methodology across countries, confirm previous studies, and demonstrate that the wage 
premium is larger in less developed economies (see the discussion of the empirical literature in section 3).   
There is some evidence that the effects of foreign takeovers on average wages tend to become larger over 
time. The effects of foreign takeovers after two years tend to be larger than their direct effect immediately 
after takeovers in all countries for which appropriate data are available, but the picture becomes less neat 
when taking also account of the impact of takeovers one year after the event. For Brazil, the foreign wage 
premium increases from 10% directly after takeover to 16% after two years; for Indonesia, it increases 
from 18% directly after the takeover to 22% after two years; for Portugal, from 5% to 8% and the wage 
premium increases from 4% to 5% in the UK.  The increase in the positive effect may reflect the time it 
takes to transfer technology from parent to affiliate and for employees to accumulate human capital.   
However, it may also reflect the impact of foreign takeovers on the composition of the workforce or the 
possibility that wage contracts do not change instantaneously.  
Foreign takeovers also tend to raise employment in some of the countries analysed, but not in all. Whereas 
foreign takeovers appear to reduce employment by about 5% in the UK, presumably reflecting the process 
of restructuring that is associated with takeovers, they raise employment by 22% in Indonesia and 24% in 
Portugal.  No significant effects are found for Brazil and Germany. The somewhat mixed picture with 
respect to employment may indicate that takeover-induced technological change may not be neutral with 
respect to the composition of inputs. A shift in emphasis from labour to capital may offset any potential   17
positive employment gains that result from the impact of technology transfer on productivity and the scale 
of production.  
Domestic takeovers of foreign firms generally have a small negative effect on average wages and 
employment.  This suggests that the effects of foreign takeovers of domestic firms and domestic takeovers 
of foreign firms are qualitatively different.  This asymmetry supports the hypothesis that foreign takeovers 
are accompanied by the transfer of modern production and management practices from the parent to the 
foreign affiliate. 
[Insert Table 5] 
6.2  The average effect of foreign ownership on individual wages 
6.2.1 Cross-border  takeovers 
Table 6 presents new evidence of the effects of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on individual wages 
using linked employer-employee data for Brazil, Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Simple comparisons across workers in foreign-owned and domestic firms reveal significant differences in 
individual wages ranging from about 10% in Germany, 20% in the UK, 25% in Portugal and 70% in 
Brazil.  Controlling for observable worker and firm characteristics reduces individual pay differences 
between workers in foreign-owned and domestic firms, but they remain fairly large.  The wage gap varies 
from 4% in Germany to 12% in Portugal and the UK and 23% in Brazil.  Due to the roles of worker and 
firm selection these estimates may be expected to be upward biased. One can address these problems by 
focusing on the short-term effects of changes in ownership status due to cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. Despite the biased nature of these conditional cross-sectional comparisons, they are still 
interesting as they provide a useful upper bound on the average effect of foreign ownership by also 
capturing the effects of greenfield investments and the longer-term effects of foreign ownership, which 
may be more positive than the short-term effects of cross-border takeovers alone.  
Foreign takeovers of domestic firms tend to have a small positive or zero effect on the individual wages of 
workers who stay in the same firm relative to similar workers who stay in domestic firms that are not taken 
over in developed countries.  The results suggest zero effect in the UK and a small positive effect for 
Brazil, Germany and Portugal of 1%, 3% and 4%, respectively.  The absence of a positive effect in the UK   18
                                                     
may reflect the relative flexibility of the UK labour market compared with Germany and Portugal that 
makes it hard to sustain differences in pay for identical workers across firms. 
17 
The time-profile of the effects of foreign takeovers on individual wages differs across countries. The 
results for Brazil indicate an instantaneous positive effect of 4%, then turn negative and end with a positive 
effect of 0.4%  two years after the takeover.  For Portugal, the foreign wage premium increases from 2% 
directly after the takeover to 5% after two years. The effects of domestic takeovers of foreign firms on 
individual wages are also mixed: positive in Germany (0.5%), negative in Portugal (-4%) and insignificant 
in the United Kingdom.  
6.2.2 Worker  movements 
In order to identify the effect of foreign ownership for individual wages, the subsequent analysis exploits 
worker movements between domestic and foreign-owned firms.  The results are reported in Table 7.  The 
results indicate wage gains for workers who move from domestic to foreign firms and wage losses for 
workers who move from foreign to domestic firms. As it seems plausible that wage gains reflect mostly 
voluntary worker movements (quits), whereas wage losses mostly reflect involuntary worker movements 
(layoffs), this is consistent with the findings presented above that foreign affiliates tend to provide better 
working conditions and career prospects than comparable domestic firms.  It is also interesting to note that 
the wage gains associated with worker movements from domestic to foreign firms tend to grow with 
tenure, while evidence with respect to the time-profile of wage losses associated with worker movements 
from foreign to domestic firms is more mixed.
18 
[Insert Table 7] 
There is some evidence that the human capital that is accumulated in foreign firms can be transferred to 
domestic firms by workers who move from foreign to domestic firms.  Comparing the magnitude of wage 
gains associated with worker movements from domestic to foreign firms with the wage losses associated 
with worker movements from foreign to domestic firms gives an idea of the extent to which worker 
 
17 Using the same data but a somewhat different methodology Andrews et al. (2007) also find that foreign takeovers 
raise individual wages by 3% in Germany. The results for Portugal differ somewhat from earlier results in Martins 
(2004) but are in the same range as those reported in Almeida (2007). The differences with Martins (2004), whose 
study is the most similar to the present one in terms of methodology and set-up can be attributed to the fact that the 
present analysis controls for lagged wages whereas Martins (2004) did not. The time period and sectoral coverage are 
also different. 
18 In Portugal, wage losses appear to fall gradually with time, while in Brazil an opposite picture may be observed.    19
                                                     
mobility may be a potentially important channel for wage spillovers.  To the extent that wage gains are not 
completely offset by corresponding wage losses, workers may be able to carry with them some of the 
knowledge that they have accumulated in foreign firms.  The results indicate that wage gains are 
considerably larger than wage losses in each of the four countries analysed.  Thus, worker mobility could 
be an important channel for wage spillovers.
 19 
6.3  The effect of foreign ownership on other wage and working conditions  
So far, the analysis has concentrated on average differences in pay between foreign-owned and domestic 
firms. However, theory and previous evidence suggest that the effects of foreign takeovers are unlikely to 
be evenly distributed across workers with different levels of skills.   Moreover, foreign ownership may not 
only affect wage outcomes but also various non-wage working conditions. In the remainder of this section, 
the attention shifts from average wage effects to a number of alternative dimensions of wage and non-wage 
working conditions than can be measured in the available data.   
6.3.1 The effect of foreign takeovers on wages of different skill groups 
This sub-section repeats the analysis of foreign takeovers whilst distinguishing between different skill 
groups. In a first instance, the impact of foreign takeovers on the wages of production and non-production 
workers will be analysed at the firm-level using data for Brazil and Indonesia. Individual-level data are not 
available for Indonesia and Brazil is added for comparability? In a second step, a more detailed analysis 
will be conducted at the level of the individual worker for the countries for which linked employer-
employee data are available by distinguishing between workers with low, medium and high levels of skills. 
Firm-level results 
The firm-level results for Brazil and Indonesia are reported in Table 8. The results provide some evidence 
that foreign wage premia may be more important for skilled than for unskilled workers in emerging 
economies. In Indonesia, estimated foreign wage premia differ considerably across skilled and unskilled 
workers, being 30% for the former and 17% for the latter.
20 In Brazil, a positive effect of 11% is found for 
 
19 However, the analysis is limited to the private returns to worker mobility. In order to analyse wage externalities, 
one would also have to analyse the wage effects of worker mobility on incumbent workers.  
20 These results are of the same order of magnitude as those reported by Lipsey and Sjöholm (2006) who use the same 
data for a somewhat different time period. They find that foreign takeovers raise production-worker wages by 17% 
and non-production workers by 33%.   20
skilled workers and no significant effect for unskilled workers. However, when looking at the estimated 
coefficients, there is no clear difference between skilled and unskilled workers in Brazil. While the positive 
wage gains for skilled workers appear to strengthen over time in both Brazil and Indonesia, the wage gains 
for unskilled workers in Indonesia may only be temporary. 
[Insert Table 8] 
Worker-level results 
Table 9 reports the effects of foreign takeovers of domestic firms on the wages of low-skilled, semi-skilled 
and high-skilled workers. The results imply important differences across countries with respect to the role 
of skill in both qualitative and quantitative terms. In the United Kingdom, the results suggest a small 
negative impact on the wages of low-skilled workers and no effect for semi- and high-skilled workers. By 
contrast, in Germany and Portugal, the impact of foreign takeovers on wages is positive for all three skill 
groups and differences across skill groups are modest. If anything, foreign takeovers tend to benefit most 
workers with medium skills. For Brazil, the results indicate large differences across skill groups with a 
positive effect for unskilled workers, a smaller but still positive effect for semi-skilled workers and a 
negative effect for skilled workers. The findings for Brazil differ from the prevailing view in the literature 
that the effects of foreign ownership tend to be more important for skilled workers and also from different 
from the firm-level results presented in Table  8. This could indicate that foreign takeovers are also 
associated with important workforce composition effects within skill groups. However, the worker-level 
results are not directly comparable with the firm-level results, because skill groups are defined differently. 
All in all, there is little evidence that the wage effects of foreign takeovers are more pronounced for more 
skilled workers as we conjectured in the theory section of this paper. One possible explanation for the 
limited support for our conjecture in the data may be that the analysis here only focuses on the short-term 
effects of foreign takeovers, whereas the incentives to offer higher wages to retain skilled workers to 
prevent firm-specific knowledge from spilling over to the competition may not be very strong in the first 
three years after the takeover. Other possibility may be that the positive impact of cross-border takeovers is 
concentrated among a relatively small group of skilled workers such as CEOs and managers as suggested 
by Heyman et al. (2006) in the case of Sweden.  
[Insert Table 9]   21
                                                     
6.3.2   The effects of foreign ownership on other working conditions 
Table 10 presents results on the impact of foreign takeovers of domestic firms on a number of working 
conditions other than average pay.  These are working hours (weekly working hours for full-time workers), 
worker turnover (the rate of job separation), union coverage (the presence of a collective agreement) and 
low pay (the probability of receiving a wage equal or lower than the minimum wage). 
Hours of work 
Raw comparisons between foreign and domestic firms (not reported) suggest that actual working hours are 
longer in foreign firms in Brazil, Portugal and the UK.
21  However, this is largely due to specific firm 
characteristics of firms that are acquired by foreign owners.  Foreign takeovers, if anything, have a slight 
negative impact on working hours.  The results are generally not statistically significant and even in Brazil 
where they are statistically significant, they are economically negligible (i.e. foreign takeover is estimated 
to reduce working hours by 0.2%, or about 5 minutes per week).  A reduction in working hours as a result 
of foreign takeovers may result when i) foreign takeovers increase hourly earnings and this induces 
employees to substitute working time for leisure; or ii) when foreign firms are more likely to comply with 




There is some evidence that foreign takeovers increase worker turnover in Portugal, while no effect is 
found in either Brazil or Germany.  Increased worker turnover, in principle, may reflect the process of 
restructuring that accompanies such takeovers in the short-term.  It may also result from the possibility that 
foreign-owned firms have higher worker turnover than domestic firms in the longer-term.  Level 
 
21 In Germany, for which actual hours of work are not available and standard hours are used instead, there is no 
difference between foreign and domestic firms. This may reflect the fact that in Germany sectoral collective 
agreements have a major influence over standard working hours (Lee et al., 2007). 
22 The relationship between foreign ownership and hours of work is complicated as one needs to take account of the 
relationship between ownership and both employee and employer preferences over hours of work. Neither is clear. To 
the extent that foreign takeovers increase hourly earnings, they either increase or decrease employee preferences over 
hours of work: employees may desire to work more because the ‘cost’ of not working increases, but it is equally 
possible that they wish to work less when their income increases. Employer preferences over working hours may 
change when MNEs are more likely to comply with national labour provisions than domestic firms: labour provisions 
that increase the cost of employment (such as employment protection legislation) may be expected to increase 
preferences for long working hours and statutory regulation of working hours may decrease preferences for long 
working hours. Foreign and domestic firms may also differ in the extent to which they wish to allow for greater 
flexibility in working hours in an effort to reduce worker turnover.   22
                                                     
comparisons between domestic and foreign firms suggest that foreign-owned firms experience higher 
worker turnover also in the longer term (not reported).  A possible explanation for this may be that foreign-
owned firms have more elastic labour demand as they more easily substitute local workers for workers in 
other locations in response to changes in relative wages (Fabbri et al. 2003; Barba-Navaretti et al. 2003; 
Hijzen and Swaim, 2010). 
Union coverage  
In the UK, foreign takeovers appear to reduce the probability of being covered by a collective agreement. 
This may indicate that foreign firms are less likely to engage in collective agreements or that foreign 
MNEs in the UK originate from countries where collective agreements are less common. Foreign takeovers 
in Germany do not appear to have an impact on the probability of being covered by a multi-firm collective 
agreement or a single-firm collective agreement relative to no collective agreement. Given the importance 
of collective agreement in employer-employee relations in Germany the absence of a significant effect 
does not seem surprising.   
Low pay 
While individuals in foreign-owned firms are less likely to earn the minimum wage (or less) than those in 
domestic firms (not reported),
23 foreign takeovers appear to increase the probability in Brazil and Portugal 
of employees earning the minimum wage or less relative to comparable workers in firms that are not taken 
over, but there is no such effect in the United Kingdom.  Note that in Brazil and Portugal, this does not 
necessarily mean that workers are worse off in absolute terms, but that workers in the bottom-end of the 
wage distribution do not experience as much wage growth as they would have done had their firm not had 
been taken over by a foreign owner.   
 [Insert Table 10] 
 
23 This indicates that foreign firms employ on average fewer low-pay workers than domestic firms.   23
7 Concluding  remarks 
Until recently the empirical literature on the role of foreign ownership on wages was characterised by a 
consensus that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than domestic firms and that foreign-wage premia 
are particularly important in emerging economies.  This consensus was to a large extent based on evidence 
that identifies the role of foreign ownership on average wages by focusing on cross-border takeovers using 
longitudinal firm-level data. This paper provides three sets of findings that help to sharpen and qualify the 
consensus in the literature. 
First, this paper replicates the evidence on which the consensus is based by applying a standardised 
methodology to firm-level data for three developed countries and two large emerging economies. The 
results confirm that foreign-owned firms offer higher average wages than their domestic counterparts in all 
five countries. Moreover, consistent with the conventional wisdom, foreign-wage premia appear to be 
particularly important in emerging economies.  Foreign-wage premia in the three developed countries are 
consistently below 10% (between 3% and 8%) and foreign-wage premia in the two emerging economies in 
the range of 10% and 20%.  
Second, this paper shows that the conventional wisdom may be overstating the true wage premium.  We 
apply a standardised methodology to analyse the effects of cross-border takeovers using linked worker-
firm data for three developed countries and one large emerging economy.  Foreign wage premia are much 
smaller than previously believed: foreign-wage premia are less than 4% in all the four countries analysed 
and may even disappear altogether. Moreover, there is no longer any indication that foreign-wage premia 
are more important in emerging economies, although one should be careful in drawing strong conclusions 
as the worker-level analysis only involves one emerging economy. To the extent that foreign takeovers 
lead to changes in the skill composition in favour of more skilled workers, this may indeed imply that the 
foreign-wage premia found in firm-level studies are largely spurious. However, to properly assess the 
implications of the recent worker-level evidence on the effects of cross-border takeovers on wages, it is 
important to understand what lies behind the compositional changes in the workforce that appear to be 
associated with cross-border takeovers.  
Third, this paper shows –using the same standardised methodology as for takeovers for four countries - that 
foreign-wage premia associated with worker movements from domestic to foreign firms may be 
economically important and that such movements may be more beneficial for workers in less developed 
countries (in the order of 5% to 10% for the three developed countries and over 20% in Brazil). Moreover, 
to the extent that substantial wage differences between similar workers within firms may be hard to sustain   24
one would expect the positive effects of foreign ownership to new hires to trickle down to the rest of the 
workforce with time. The results on worker mobility further suggest that compositional changes in the 
workforce as a result of entry of new workers and exit of incumbent workers may also account for some of 
the observed differences in foreign wage premia in firm-level studies of cross-border takeovers and 
worker-level studies that restrict the sample to incumbent workers.  
While this is not the first paper to show that foreign-wage premia become much smaller once one controls 
for changes in the composition of the workforce, or to look at the role of foreign ownership in the context 
worker movements, this study is much more comprehensive in providing comparable results using a 
standardised methodology to analyse both cross-border takeovers and worker movements for four different 
countries. As a result, it provides a substantially better basis for assessing the implications of various 
worker-level studies for the conventional wisdom.   
Altogether, our reading from the present results is that one should be careful not to exaggerate the potential 
positive effects of foreign direct investment on workers abroad, but that there is as of yet no sufficient basis 
for adjusting the conventional wisdom qualitatively. The main reason for remaining loyal to the 
conventional view – for the moment - is that the new evidence on foreign takeovers is based on a arguably 
quite narrow aspect of foreign direct investment by restricting itself to the short-term effects of foreign 
takeovers to incumbents workers. The conditional cross-sectional comparisons of average wages between 
domestic and foreign firms provide some suggestive evidence that the effects of foreign ownership could 
be more positive, particularly in emerging economies, in the longer term; for newly hired workers; or for 
workers in “Greenfield” investments.  
This paper further contributes to the literature by going beyond average wages by studying the role of 
foreign ownership for the wages of different groups of workers as well as for non-wage working 
conditions. As this is relatively unchartered territory, the results with respect to this part of the analysis are 
much more tentative. While we hypothesised that the wage effects of foreign ownership are likely to be 
more pronounced for more skilled workers, the evidence for this in the paper is mixed. Although the firm-
level evidence tends to be in line with the conjecture, the more detailed analysis at the worker-level 
suggests that distributional effects may differ importantly across countries. Possible explanations for these 
mixed results may relate to the short horizon of the takeover analysis, which may not be long enough to 
accumulate important firm-specific knowledge and thus to create incentives to offer higher wages, or the 
relatively crude definition of skill used in this paper. From the analysis of other non-wage working 
conditions, one may draw the following tentative conclusions.  First, the evidence that foreign takeovers 
affect working conditions other than average wages is considerably weaker than that in the context of   25
average wages.  Second, in contrast to average wages, the impact of foreign takeovers on other working 
conditions is not unambiguously positive.  Third, there is little evidence to suggest that MNEs export 
working conditions abroad.  While foreign takeovers may have some impact on non-wage working 
conditions, it is not clear whether these effects derive from a centralised policy or reflect the rational 
response by foreign-owned firms to local conditions.  
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Table 1. An overview of the literature on foreign wage premia 
Study  Country  Sample  Treatment
a  Main findings 
 












Positive and significant wage differences for Mexico 
and Venezuela after controlling for plant size, 
geographic location, skill mix and capital intensity, 














Foreign wage premia ranging from 8% to 23% after 




Indonesia  1996, manufacturing  Foreign-
owned 
Wages in foreign-owned plants are 12% higher for 
production workers and 20% for non-production 
workers than in domestic plants. 
 
II. Longitudinal studies ( Firm-fixed effect)s 
Almeida 
(2007) 




Foreign takeovers have a small positive effect of 2-











Cross-border takeovers have small positive effect of 
3.3% on average wages. 
Earle and 
Telegdy (2007) 
Hungary  1986-2003  Takeovers, 
symmetric 
Cross-border takeovers have a positive effect of 7% 
on average wages. 
Görg and 







Takeovers of UK firms by US firms increases the 
wage of both skilled and unskilled workers (4-13%), 
but takeovers by non-UK EU firms do not.   
Huttunen 
(2007) 




Foreign takeovers have a positive effect on wages. 
The wage increase occurs within one to three years 
from the acquisition. 
Sjöholm and 
Lipsey (2006) 




Foreign takeovers have a positive effect of 10% on 
the average wage of blue-collar workers and 21% on 
the average wage of white-collar workers.   30
Table 1. An overview of the literature on foreign wage premia (cont’d) 
Study  Country  Sample  Treatment
a  Main findings 
 







2000 and 2004   Takeovers and 
movers, 
asymmetric 
For West-Germany foreign takeovers are associated 
with 3% increase in individual wage. The effects for 
East Germany tend to be insignificant. Movers from 
domestic to foreign firms experience an increase in 
wages of 6%.  





Foreign takeovers have a small positive effect of 3% 
on individual wages. Movers from domestic to 




Sweden  1996-2000  Takeovers, 
symmetric 
Foreign takeovers have a small negative effect of  




Sweden  1996-2000  Takeovers, 
asymmetric  
Foreign takeovers increase wages of high-skilled 
workers by 2% and reduce wages of medium and 




Denmark  2000-2002   Takeovers, 
symmetric 
Foreign takeovers have small positive effect of 1% 
on individual wages. 




Foreign takeovers have small negative effect -3% on 
individual wages. 
aSome studies impose the assumption of symmetry on the treatment. In the present case, this means that the effects of 
changes in ownership from foreign to domestic and domestic to foreign are assumed to be of the same magnitude but 
of opposite sign.  If this assumption is not imposed but both changes are allowed, the treatment is said to be 
asymmetric.   31
Table 2. National data sources 
   Germany  Portugal  United Kingdom  Brazil  Indonesia 
Data 
sources 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung (IAB) 
Establishment Panel and the 
employment statistics register 















(BSD) and Annual 



















Plant  Firm  Firm  Firm  Plant  
Sample 
selection 
All plants with employees 
subject to social security. 
Large plants are 
oversampled. The sample 
comprises about 1% of plants 
and 10% of employees.  




sample” of the ARD 
is a census of firms 
with 250 or more 
employees, and a 
sample of smaller 
firms. The BSD 
includes all 
enterprises whose 
plants are subject to 
VAT or social 
security. 
All firms with at 
least one employee. 
The census surveys 
all registered 
manufacturing 
plants with more 
than 20 employees.  
Sectoral 
coverage 









 2000 and 2004  1997-2004 
except 2001  
1997-2005  1994-2005  1997-2005 except 
2001 
   32
Table 3: Summary statistics of log wage by ownership status (in national currency) 
Germany Portugal 
United 
Kingdom Brazil  Indonesia 
(a) Firm/establishment level 
All firms 
N  3,474 146,843  78,850  156,524  74,723 
Mean log wage  4.351 1,464  2.921  1.964 8.408 
S.D.  0.345 0.447  0.588  0.660 0.998 
  
Foreign-owned 
N  290 7,081  9,220  2,165 9,632 
Mean log wage  4.587 2.024  3.254  3.282 9.018 
S.D.  0.323 0.546  0.475  0.666 0.924 
  
Domestic 
N  3,184 139,762  69,630  154,359 65,091 
Mean log wage  4.33 1.436  2.877  1.945 8.318 
S.D.  0.339 0.422  0.587  0.641 0.977 
  
(b) Worker level 
All workers 
N  397,584 6,928,076  441,159 12,775,660 
Mean log wage  4.625  1.537  2.199  2.484 





N 87,697  984,831  78,644  2,536,778 
Mean log wage  4.701  1.765  2.366  3.021 




N 309,887  5,943,245  362,515  10,238,882 
Mean log wage  4.604  1.499  2.162  2.351 
S.D. 0.3  0.567  0.513  0.922 
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Table 4: Foreign ownership changes of workers and firms  
Treatment Germany  Portugal  United 
Kingdom  Brazil Indonesia 
              
  Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs.  %  Obs.  %  Obs. % 
Foreign takeovers of domestic firms 








0.01 793  1.06 
Domestic takeovers of foreign firms 








n.a 463  0.62 
Foreign takeovers of domestic firms 









Domestic takeovers of foreign firms 









Workers moving from domestic to 









Workers moving from foreign to 
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Table 5: The effects of cross-border takeovers on average wages and employment: Firm-level evidence 
Panel a: Average wages 
    Germany    Portugal   UK   Brazil   Indonesia  
(a) Level comparisons
a                   
 without controls    0.255 *** 0.588 *** 0.366 *** 1.332 *** 0.771 ***
    (0.020)    (0.015)   (0.010)   (0.014)   (0.010)  
 with controls    0.106 *** 0.357 *** 0.297 *** 1.054 *** 0.334 ***
    (0.017)    (0.004)   (0.010)   (0.013)   (0.011)  
(b) Foreign takeovers of domestic firms
b 
Average effect     0.028    *  0.078 *** 0.050 ** 0.111 **  0.189 ***
    (0.015)    (0.010)   (0.019)   (0.053)   (0.046)  
Effect at  t=0  NA    0.046 *  0.038   0.100 *  0.175 ***
        (0.025)   (0.020)   (0.058)   (0.044)  
   t=1  NA      0.106 *** 0.059 ** 0.077     0.206 **
        (0.027)   (0.022)   (0.064)   (0.084)  
   t=2  NA      0.081 *** 0.053 *  0.157 **  0.221 **
        (0.027)   (0.025)   (0.064)   (0.090)  
(c) Domestic takeovers of foreign firms
b 
Average effect     -0.018     -0.009     -0.061     NA     0.008   
    (0.037)    (0.027)   (0.041)      (0.057)  
Effect at   t=0  NA     0.000     -0.049     NA     0.011   
        (0.034)   (0.043)      (0.060)  
   t=1  NA     -0.015     -0.063     NA     -0.032   
        (0.031)   (0.056)      (0.090)  
   t=2  NA     -0.012     -0.072     NA     0.007   
        (0.036)   (0.058)      (0.106)  
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Panel b: Employment 
   Germany    Portugal   United 
Kingdom 
 Brazil    Indonesia   
(a) Level comparisons
a 
without  controls    1.632 ***   0.827 *** 0.890 ***  2.004 ***  1.244 *** 
    (0.102)   (0.011)   (0.031)   (0.026)   (0.014)  
 with controls    1.155  ***  0.776  *** 0.872  ***  1.875  ***  1.065  *** 
    (0.089)   ..   (0.031)   (0.026)   (0.014)  
(b) Foreign takeovers of domestic firms
b 
Average effect     -0.060     0.238  *** -0.047  *  0.140     0.220  *** 
    (0.097)   (0.061)   (0.022)   (0.111)   (0.027)  
Effect  at    t=0  NA     0.238 *** -0.043   0.097     0.213 *** 
       (0.066)   (0.081)   (0.131)   (0.027)  
    t=1  NA     0.235   *** -0.065 **  0.156     0.245 *** 
       (0.064)   (0.025)   (0.117)   (0.046)  
   t=2  NA     0.241  *** -0.034     0.167     0.247  *** 
       (0.076)   (0.031)   (0.130)   (0.060)  
(c) Domestic takeovers of foreign firms
b 
Average effect     -0.042      0.005  *  -0.013     NA     0.059  ** 
    (0.165)   (0.097)   (0.046)      (0.028)  
Effect at   t=0  NA      0.015  *** 0.014     NA     0.001   
       (0.104)   (0.034)      (0.052)  
  t=1  NA      0.018  *** -0.015     NA     0.073   
       (0.101)   (0.057)      (0.069)  
  t=2  NA     -0.017 *** -0.037     NA     5.307  
       (0.120)   (0.068)      (0.001)  
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, confidence interval based on robust standard errors. 
a Estimations with OLS. Coefficients reflect percentage differences. Controls include log employment, industry and 
region dummies for the average wage comparisons, and industry and region dummies for the employment 
comparisons.  
b Estimations with difference-in-difference propensity-score matching. Coefficients reflect percentage differences in 
the average wage and employment between firms that change ownership status relative to their counterfactual value 
had they remained under domestic ownership.   36
Table 6: The effects of cross-border takeovers of domestic firms on individual wages:  
Evidence from linked employer-employee data 
    Germany   Portugal   UK   Brazil  
(a) Level comparisons
a               
  without  controls    0.092 ***  0.265 ***  0.194 ***  0.691 *** 
    (0.001)    (0.001)   (0.004)   (0.001)  
  with  controls    0.040 ***  0.121 ***  0.117 ***  0.233 *** 
    (0.001)    (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.000)  
(b) Foreign takeovers of domestic firms
b 
Average  effect      0.028 ***  0.037 ***  -0.004     0.012 *** 
    (0.002)    (0.003)   (0.006)   (0.002)  
Effect at   t=0  NA    0.015 ***  0.004     0.044 *** 
        (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.002)  
   t=1  NA    0.051 ***  -0.003     -0.013 *** 
        (0.004)   (0.007)   (0.002)  
   t=2  NA    0.045 ***  -0.012     0.004 ** 
        (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.002)  
(c) Domestic takeovers of foreign firms
b 
Average  effect      0.005 **  -0.037 ***  0.022     NA    
    (0.003)    (0.005)   (0.014)     
Effect at   t=0  NA    -0.076 ***  -0.005     NA    
        (0.006)   (0.013)     
   t=1  NA    -0.045 ***  0.030     NA    
        (0.005)   (0.017)     
   t=2  NA    0.011   0.039   NA    
        (0.006)   (0.021)     
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confidence interval based on robust standard errors. 
a Estimations with OLS. 
b Estimations with difference-in-difference propensity-score matching. Coefficients reflect the average percentage 
differences between the wages of workers whose firm changes ownership status relative to their counterfactual wage 
had their firm not changed ownership status. 
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Table 7: The effects of worker mobility on individual wages 
Evidence from linked employer-employee data
a 
   Germany  Portugal U K  Brazil 
From  domestic to foreign firms           
Average effect     0.047***  0.136***  0.052**  0.213*** 
   (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.017) (0.009) 
Effect at   t=0 NA    0.115***  0.040* 0.160*** 
     (0.005)  (0.020) (0.010) 
   t=1 NA    0.138***  0.059**  0.228*** 
     (0.005)  (0.021) (0.010) 
   t=2 NA    0.154***  0.058**  0.252*** 
     (0.005)  (0.021) (0.010) 
From foreign to domestic firms           
Average effect     -0.021  -0.037*** -0.011  -0.016 
   (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.026) (0.009) 
Effect at   t=0 NA   -0.050***  -0.019  0.013 
     (0.006)  (0.029) (0.010) 
   t=1 NA   -0.040***  0.016  0.040*** 
     (0.006)  (0.029) (0.004) 
   t=2 NA   -0.020***  -0.032 -0.101*** 
     (0.006)  (0.030) (0.011) 
          
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confidence interval based on robust standard errors. 
a Estimations are conducted with difference-in-difference propensity-score matching. Coefficients reflect the average 
percentage differences between the wage of workers who move to a firm with different ownership status relative to 
their counterfactual outcomes had they not changed jobs.   38
Table 8: The effects of cross-border takeovers of domestic firms on wages by skill group 
Evidence from firm-level data for Brazil and Indonesia
a  
   Brazil 
 
Indonesia 
   Unskilled   Skilled  Unskilled   Skilled   
Average effect     0.088    0.110 *  0.165 *** 0.276 ***
    (0.075)    (0.052)   (0.050)   (0.063)  
Effect at  t=0  0.011    0.112   0.167 *** 0.262 ***
    (0.081)    (0.058)   (0.060)   (0.060)  
   t=1  0.113      0.093   0.142   0.333   ***
    (0.076)    (0.093)   (0.089)   (0.118)  
   t=2  0.142      0.125 *  0.099   0.456 ***
    (0.094)    (0.058)   (0.105)   (0.143)  
*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively, confidence interval based on robust standard errors. 
a) Estimations with difference-in-difference propensity-score matching. Coefficients reflect percentage differences between firms 
that change ownership status relative to their counterfactual value had they remained under domestic ownership. 
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Table 9: The effects of cross-border takeovers of domestic firms on wages by skill group 
Evidence from linked employer-employee data
a 
 Germany Portugal UK Brazil
Unskilled workers  
Average effect    0.018*** 0.019*** -0.025**  0.054***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
Effect at  t=0  NA -0.005 -0.007  0.046***
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
t=1  NA 0.031*** -0.031*** 0.053***
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
t=2  NA 0.033*** -0.036*** 0.067***
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Semi-skilled workers  
Average effect    0.027*** 0.053*** 0.006   0.008***
  (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003)
Effect at  t=0  NA 0.028*** 0.009  0.048***
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.003)
t=1  NA 0.085*** 0.010  -0.019***
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.003)
t=2  NA 0.049*** -0.000  -0.007**
  (0.009) (0.012) (0.003)
Skilled workers  
Average effect    0.014*** 0.041*** 0.001   -0.046***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
Effect at  t=0  NA 0.022*** -0.006  0.027***
  (0.006) (0.013) (0.006)
t=1  NA 0.050*** 0.015  -0.108***
  (0.006) (0.013) (0.006)
t=2  NA 0.049*** -0.005  -0.061***
  (0.006) (0.014) (0.006)
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confidence interval based on robust standard errors. 
a Estimations with difference-in-difference propensity-score matching. Coefficients reflect the average percentage 
differences between the wage of workers whose firm changes ownership status relative to their counterfactual wage 
had their firm not changed ownership status.   40
Table 10: The effects of foreign takeovers of domestic firms on individual working conditions: 
Evidence from linked employer-employee data
a 
     Germany    Portugal U K  Brazil 
(a) Log weekly hours  Average effect     -0.291
c 
   -0.002   -0.001   -0.002***
     (0.593)    (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) 
  Effect at  t=0  NA     -0.003   0.001   -0.001***
          (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) 
     t=1  NA     -0.009*** 0.002   -0.005***
          (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) 
     t=2  NA     0.007** -0.006   0.000  
          (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) 
(b) Worker turnover  Average effect     -0.034     0.055** NA   0.052  
     (0.039)      (0.026)    (0.043) 
   Effect at  t=0  NA     0.020   NA   0.029  
            (0.020)    (0.022) 
   t=1  NA    0.078** NA   0.057  
        (0.030)   (0.048) 
   t=2 NA    0.066** NA    0.070* 
        (0.025)   (0.040) 
(c) Low pay
b  Average effect     NA     0.006*** -0.002   0.001***
          (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
  Effect at  t=0  NA     -0.000   -0.006   0.001  
          (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
     t=1  NA     0.011*** 0.001   0.002***
          (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) 
     t=2  NA     0.007** 0.000   0.001  
          (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) 
(d) Union coverage  Average effect     -0.056 
   NA   -0.039**  NA  
     (0.078)      (0.013)   
  Effect at  t=0  NA     NA   -0.008   NA  
           (0.015)   
     t=1  NA     NA   -0.053***  NA  
           (0.015)   
     t=2  NA     NA   -0.055***  NA  
           (0.015)   
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% confidence interval based on robust standard errors. 
a Estimations with difference-in-difference propensity-score matching.  
b The sample is restricted to 1999-2005 due to the introduction of the minimum wage in 1998 in the United Kingdom. 
c Estimates are based on standard working hours at the firm-level. 
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Table A1. Variable definitions 
 Germany  Portugal  United  Kingdom Brazil  Indonesia 
Foreign 
ownership  
More than 50% of 
assets owned by a 
foreign entity (plant) 
More than 50% of 
assets owned by a 
foreign entity (firm) 
More than 10% of 
assets owned by a 
foreign entity (firm) 
More than 50% of 
assets owned by a 
foreign entity (firm) 
More than 50% of 
assets owned by a 
foreign entity 
(plant) 
Employment  Log total number of 
employees 
Log total number of 
employees 
Log total number of 
employees 
Log total number of 
employees 




Log of the average 
individual wage 
Log total wage bill 
divided by 
employment  
Log total wage bill 
divided by 
employment. 
Log total wage bill 
divided by 
employment  
Log total wage 




Log daily wage, 
censored at the social 
security ceiling 
Log hourly wage  Log gross hourly 
wage 
Log hourly wage  Not available 
Working 
hours  
Log standard working 
hours at plant-level 
available in 2001, 
2002, 2004.  
Log total working 
hours 
Log total working 
hours 
Log total working 
hours 
Not available 
Low pay  Germany does not 
have a statutory 
minimum wage 
Dummy equal to 1 
when earning the 
minimum wage or 
less 
Dummy equal to 1 
when earning the 
minimum wage or 
less 
Dummy equal to 1 
when earning the 





Dummy equal to 1 
when covered by 
sectoral or plant-level 
agreement 
Dummy equal to 1 




Dummy equal to 1 
when covered by a 
collective agreement 
Not available  Not available 
Job stability  The number of worker 
separations between t 
and t-1 over total 
employment at t-1 
The number of 
worker separations 
between t and t-1 
over total 
employment at t-1 
Not available  The number of 
worker separations 
between t and t-1 
over total 
employment at t-1 
Not available 
Industry   15 categories  Two-digit SIC codes  One digit SIC92 
codes  
(9) 
One-digit SIC codes 
(9) 
SIC codes 15-37 
(23) 
Region Bundesländer  (11 
regions) 
Regions (5)  UK Government 
Office Region (10) 
States (27)  Provinces (34) 
Sex Gender  dummy  equal 
to 1 when male 
Gender dummy equal 
to 1 when male 
Gender dummy equal 
to 1 when male 
Gender dummy equal 
to 1 when male 
Not available 
Age  Age   Age   Age   Age   Not available 
Skill  Dummy for high, 
semi- and low-skilled 
based on highest 
educational 
qualification 
Based on  education 
groups 
Dummy for high, 
semi- and low-skilled 
based on SOC2000 
1-digit categories 




Tenure  Number of years in 
current plant 
Number of years  Dummy for >1 year 
in current position in 
firm 
Number of years  Not available 
 